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Many neuropsychiatric illnesses are associated with psychosis, i.e.,
hallucinations (perceptions in the absence of causative stimuli) and
delusions (irrational, often bizarre beliefs). Current models of brain
function view perception as a combination of two distinct sources
of information: bottom-up sensory input and top-down influences
from prior knowledge. This framework may explain hallucinations
and delusions. Here, we characterized the balance between visual
bottom-up and top-down processing in people with early psychosis
(study 1) and in psychosis-prone, healthy individuals (study 2) to
elucidate the mechanisms that might contribute to the emergence of
psychotic experiences. Through a specialized mental-health service,
we identified unmedicated individuals who experience early psy-
chotic symptoms but fall below the threshold for a categorical diagnosis.
We observed that, in early psychosis, there was a shift in information
processing favoring prior knowledge over incoming sensory evidence.
In the complementary study, we capitalized on subtle variations in
perception and belief in the general population that exhibit graded
similarity with psychotic experiences (schizotypy). We observed
that the degree of psychosis proneness in healthy individuals, and,
specifically, the presence of subtle perceptual alterations, is also
associated with stronger reliance on prior knowledge. Although, in
the current experimental studies, this shift conferred a performance
benefit, under most natural viewing situations, it may provoke
anomalous perceptual experiences. Overall, we show that early
psychosis and psychosis proneness both entail a basic shift in visual
information processing, favoring prior knowledge over incoming
sensory evidence. The studies provide complementary insights to a
mechanism by which psychotic symptoms may emerge.
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To interact successfully with our physical and social environ-ment, we need appropriate information about relevant states
of the world, such as the size, location, or distance of an object.
However, there is no direct access to this information, only to
sensory stimulation caused by the environment. This sensory in-
formation is inherently ambiguous and, on its own, rarely suffices
to uniquely specify our surroundings (1). The human visual system
overcomes this challenge by combining ambiguous sensory in-
formation with prior knowledge of the environment to generate a
robust and unambiguous representation of the world around us (1–
7). This insight has been formalized under the tenets of Bayesian
decision theory and is typically modeled within a predictive coding
framework. Here, the notion is that expectations based on prior
knowledge are fed back from higher to lower levels of information
processing, thereby shaping the way incoming signals are treated
by lower-level mechanisms. This influence is labeled top-down
processing. The present study tests the hypothesis that psychotic
experiences arise from an increased use of prior knowledge in
constructing meaningful percepts from ambiguous sensory inputs.
Psychosis—a loss of contact with external reality—is charac-
terized by delusions (irrational, often bizarre beliefs) and hal-
lucinations (perceptions in the absence of causative stimuli).
Conceptual and computational models of psychosis have hy-
pothesized that an imbalance in the combination of bottom-up
sensory evidence and top-down prior knowledge is at the core of
this altered state of mind (8–12). According to such models, at
the perceptual level, an undue reliance on prior knowledge in
perception may lead to the emergence of aberrant perceptions
such as hallucinations. The current study tests this hypothesis in
the visual domain by characterizing the impact of prior knowl-
edge on the perception of ambiguous stimuli in two groups of
people: a clinical group with early psychotic experiences (study
1) and healthy volunteers showing differing levels of proneness
to such experiences (study 2). Although the conventional view
focuses preferentially on auditory hallucinations in psychosis,
epidemiological evidence indicates that hallucinations in the vi-
sual domain are very common in, for example, schizophrenia
(13). In fact, vision seems to play a prominent role in the de-
velopment of psychosis given that basic visual symptoms identi-
fied before illness onset are one of the most powerful predictors
of the emergence of later psychotic disorders (14).
To determine mechanisms for the emergence of perceptual psy-
chotic symptoms as purely as possible, we conducted two comple-
mentary studies. First, using a case-control study design, we
characterized the balance between visual bottom-up and top-down
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processing in a group of patients with early psychotic experiences
and matched healthy controls (SI Materials and Methods and Table
S1). Individuals in our clinical group were recruited from a dedi-
cated mental health service identifying help-seeking people who
have low-level but measurable psychotic experiences. Although, at
the time of testing, these individuals fell below the threshold for a
categorical diagnosis, they already showed symptoms and have an
increased risk for transitioning to a severe mental illness such as
schizophrenia or an affective disorder (15). Importantly, working
with such a group of patients and comparing them to controls
enabled us to focus on the features of early psychosis before any
formal categorical diagnosis. Moreover, and also critically, this
comparison is not confounded by the effects of antipsychotic
medication or the impact of chronic illness, allowing us, as purely
as possible, to explore the mechanisms of early psychosis.
In a second study, we explored psychosis proneness in healthy
participants characterized according to the presence of perceptual
(16) and belief-related schizotypal features (17). Schizotypy refers
to a personality measure that has established predictive value for
psychotic and other mental illnesses (18). Although it has been
traditionally considered a specific risk measure for schizophrenia,
more recently it has been proposed to reflect a general psychosis
proneness. A number of schizotypy scales have been devised to
characterize various dimensions of psychosis. In the current study,
we focused on individual variation in measures relating to per-
ception and belief (16, 17) because they most clearly relate to the
key features of psychosis. These measures provided us with a fine-
grained index for relevant perceptual experience and beliefs,
allowing us to characterize the bottom-up/top-down balance in
relation to subtle, nonclinical but specific and measurable markers
associated with psychosis proneness.
Characterizing these two situations enabled us to pursue our
central aim of exploring information-processingmechanisms that are
altered in association with the occurrence of early symptoms (study
1) and also identifiable even before such symptoms arise (study 2).
As well as offering a purer assessment of the emergence of psychotic
experiences, this approach is inspired by growing evidence suggesting
that psychosis lies on a continuum with normality (19, 20) and is
associated with a range of different psychiatric disorders (15, 21).
According to this perspective, existing diagnostic categories group
biologically heterogeneous syndromes with potentially different
pathophysiological mechanisms into one disorder (22); this may
obfuscate our attempts to understand the neurobiological under-
pinnings ofmental illness. In keeping with a broadermovewithin the
field, the aim of this approach is therefore to characterize deeper
dimensions in their own right, such as psychosis as in the current
study, irrespective of diagnostic categorization to advance our
mechanistic understanding of specific symptom clusters.
In summary, we explored how the use of prior knowledge in visual
information processing is related to early psychosis and to psychosis
proneness. Importantly, given our hypothesis, we predicted that the
putative mechanism associated with the emergence of psychosis
would confer a relative advantage in this task, given that successful
performance required the use of prior knowledge to discriminate
ambiguous stimuli. Together, the two studies provide evidence to
Fig. 1. The case-control study (study 1). (A) Illustration of a test (Left) and a
control stimulus (Right). Test and control images had similar low-level statis-
tical properties (SI Materials andMethods) but differed in whether or not they
contained an embedded person. (B) Illustration of one session. Initially, ob-
servers viewed a block of ten two-tone images (Before Block). Across blocks,
half of the stimuli were test images that contained an embedded person, the
other half were similar-looking control images without a person. The pre-
sentation of two-tone images was followed by three blocks of ten color im-
ages, presented for 2 s in random order and back-to-back (Template Blocks).
For every test image viewed in the Before Block a matching color template
was presented, showing the clear version of the same image. Finally, in the
After Block, observers saw the same two-tone images as in the Before Block,
presented in random order. Numbers along the timeline indicate the length
of the different experimental parts in seconds; var. indicates a part of vari-
able length. In total, every observer participated in 12 sessions, separated by
self-paced breaks. (C) Illustration of one individual trial. After a brief pre-
sentation of either a test or a control image, observers were asked to in-
dicate whether the image contained a person or not. Observers had as
much time as needed to respond but in case they had not responded within
1,250 ms, a reminder to respond was shown on the screen. (D) Results of
discrimination task. (Left) Discrimination sensitivity in terms of d′ (mean ± SEM)
in the Before and the After Block, slightly jittered for both groups to correctly
display error bars; the higher the d′ values, the better observers were able to
discriminate between test and control images. (Right) Response bias in terms
of the observers’ criterion (mean ± SEM); a lower criterion indicates a response
bias to report the presence of a person in a given stimulus (independent of
whether a test or control image is shown). Healthy controls are plotted in red;
the clinical group is shown in blue.
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suggest that early psychosis and psychosis proneness is associated
with a shift in visual processing that favors prior knowledge over
incoming sensory evidence. We also demonstrate that this relation
is specific to atypical perceptual experiences rather than being
linked to psychotic experiences more generally.
Results
To quantify top-down processing, we used two-tone images as
stimuli (3, 23–26). Without appropriate knowledge, these images
appear to depict meaningless 2D black-and-white patches (Fig.
1A). Once an observer is exposed to relevant image information,
however, grouping mechanisms in the visual system are able to
integrate patches in such a way that a robust and coherent percept
of a 3D object forms. In the present study, we provided the prior
knowledge necessary to bind a two-tone image into a coherent
percept by exposing observers to the color templates that were
used to generate the two-tone images (Fig. 2). Importantly, rather
than seeing an individual two-tone and the corresponding template
image back-to-back, observers freely viewed the stimuli in blocks of
10 (SI Materials and Methods). This procedure ensured that purely
bottom-up priming was minimized in the disambiguation of two-
tone stimuli after template exposure. In combination with the fact
that sensory stimulation is identical before and after template
exposure, the perceptual change of the two-tone image in this
experimental design thus provides an ideal index of the impact
of knowledge on perception. This notion is supported by pre-
vious psychophysical and neuroimaging literature, which indi-
cates that disambiguation of two-tone images is due to top-down
influences from high-level processes onto low-level visual func-
tion (3, 23–26). In particular, two-tone image perception recruits
memory processes and object knowledge associated with cortical
areas such as precuneus and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; these
processes activate stored, high-level visual representations of the
template images and feed back information to lower-level areas
to shape perceptual processing, even as early as the primary visual
cortex V1.
In study 1, observers performed a yes/no discrimination task,
in which they viewed briefly presented two-tone images of people
and similar-looking control images without an embedded object
(Fig. 1A). Within each session, these images were presented
before and after the observer received prior knowledge by
viewing template images (Figs. 1B and 2). On every trial ob-
servers were required to indicate whether a given image con-
tained a person or not (Fig. 1C and SI Materials and Methods).
Based on signal detection theory, we derived two measures from
the observers’ performance: (i) d′, a pure index of an observer’s
perceptual mechanisms independent of response bias; and (ii)
criterion, which captures the general bias of observers to report
the presence of an object. As an objective performance measure
of the influence of knowledge on perception, we were primarily
interested in the change in d′ after having been exposed to rel-
evant image information.
The results support our hypothesis (Fig. 1D). As expected, a
mixed 2 × 2 ANOVA with the between-subjects factor group and
the within-subjects factor block found an overall increased ability
to distinguish between test and control images measured in terms
of d′ after having viewed template images in comparison with
before having seen them [F(1,32) = 29.27, P < 0.001]. Critically,
this main effect was qualified by an interaction between group
and block, indicating that the improvement in performance dif-
fered between the groups [F(1,32) = 5.02, P < 0.05]. As can be
seen in the left plot in Fig. 1D and supported by post hoc tests,
both groups showed an improvement in performance (paired
t test, controls: df = 15, t = 2.17, P < 0.05; clinical group: df = 17,
t = 5.60, P < 0.001), but this was on average more than twice as
large in the clinical group (mean ± SE: 0.35 ± 0.06) compared
with controls (0.14 ± 0.07). It is noteworthy that the increased
benefit in the clinical group was observed in the absence of an
overall difference between groups [F(1,32) < 1, not significant]
and was not due to a difference in baseline performance in the
Before block (Welch’s two-sample t test, before clinical vs. be-
fore controls: df = 31.16, t = 0.19, not significant).
Additional analyses showed that, on average, observers in both
groups had a stronger response bias (as measured by a criterion
shift) to report seeing an object after being given relevant image
information compared with before [F(1,32) = 37.77, P < 0.001;
Fig. 1D, Right]. This finding did not differ between groups [F(1,32) <
1, not significant) and is an expected change given that observers
received additional information to solve the task and were therefore
more confident in the After than in the Before Block.
In sum, study 1 shows that, in comparison with healthy controls,
observers with early psychosis can call more strongly on prior knowl-
edge at the expense of sensory evidence when faced with a visual
signal. This group comparison result thus establishes the clinical
importance of this basic information-processing shift but, as is typical
for such studies, our clinical group differs from the control group on
a range of psychiatric measures (Table S1). It is therefore difficult to
determine the specificity of the effect with respect to the two primary
psychotic symptom clusters: hallucinations and delusions. In study 2,
we sought to gain a more specific and nuanced understanding of the
relationship between psychotic symptoms and the use of knowledge
in perception.We capitalized on subtle alterations in perception and
belief across the healthy population that show a graded similarity
with psychotic experiences. This variability can be characterized in-
dependently for perception and belief by two schizotypy scales,
the Cardiff Anomalous Perception Scale (CAPS) (16) and the
Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI) (17). Note that, although other
schizotypy scales such as Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feel-
ings and Experiences (O-LIFE) (27) and Schizotypal Personality
Questionnaire (SPQ) (28) characterize a number of schizotypal
features, CAPS and PDI are specific to clinical features relating
to hallucinations and delusions respectively. In study 2, we thus
recruited a larger sample of individuals from the general population
and related their tendency to rely on prior knowledge in visual
perception to their schizotypy scores. The task was identical to that
used in the previous experiment except for two aspects: Given that
study 2 involved healthy observers only, we extended testing to 16
rather than 12 sessions to obtain a more precise estimate of every
observer’s d′; second, an improved stimulus set was used that con-
tained two image categories (people and animals) rather than one
(people) as in study 1.
The results of study 2 are plotted in Fig. 3A. As expected, prior
knowledge resulted in a significant improvement in the ability to
distinguish between test and control images (Fig. 3A left plot; paired
t test, df = 39, t = 7.08, P < 0.001). Similar to the previous experi-
ment, we also observed a criterion shift (Fig. 3A, Right; paired t test,
df = 39, t = 4.11, P < 0.001). Due to the differences in experimental
design, we cannot directly compare performance across experiments.
Nevertheless, as expected, it is evident that inclusion of a second
image category in study 2 made the task more difficult, explaining
the performance differences between the two experiments in healthy
observers. Importantly and in line with the results of study 1, Fig. 3B
indicates that the performance benefit due to prior knowledge was
related to both the extent to which an observer experienced
anomalous perceptual phenomena similar to those of psychotic
patients as measured by CAPS (Fig. 3B, Left; product-moment,
r = 0.42, df = 38, t = 2.98, P < 0.01) and the extent to which they
showed a delusion-like style of thinking as measured by PDI
(Fig. 3B, Right; r = 0.33, df = 38, t = 2.14, P < 0.05). As was
expected, however, the schizotypy scales for perception and belief
were positively correlated (r = 0.40, df = 38, t = 2.67, P < 0.05),
and we therefore conducted a first-order partial correlation
analyses to determine the amount of variability in performance
that can be explained by schizotypal features related to perception
or belief alone. This analysis indicated a very specific effect. The
relation between a delusion-like style of thinking and performance
benefit due to prior knowledge disappeared once an observer’s
anomalous perceptual experiences were taken into account (first-
order partial correlation, r = 0.19, df = 37, t = 1.17, not signifi-
cant). By contrast, a significant relation between CAPS and
performance benefit remained even when PDI was controlled for
(r = 0.35, df = 37, t = 2.28, P < 0.05).

























Our studies were designed to characterize, in complementary
ways, the balance between visual bottom-up and top-down pro-
cessing in clinical individuals with early psychosis and healthy
people prone to developing psychotic symptoms. A relative ad-
vantage in using prior knowledge to discriminate between am-
biguous images was observed in both situations. This finding is
especially striking in the clinical group in study 1 given that
performance in this group (as in psychiatrically ill individuals
more generally) is typically impaired. Such a result is rare and
revealing in that it highlights a specific information-processing
atypicality rather than a general performance deficit. Study 2
allowed us to characterize these alterations in visual function
more completely by adopting an individual differences approach
with healthy participants and by capitalizing on subtle variations
in perception and belief that exhibit graded similarity with psy-
chotic experiences. In line with our clinical findings, we uncov-
ered a relation between an individual’s visual performance
benefit due to prior knowledge and their scores on two scales of
psychosis proneness. Importantly, also, our data suggest that this
relation is primarily driven by perceptual alterations rather than
unusual beliefs. Taken together, these results indicate that visual
function in early psychosis and in healthy people who are prone
to such experiences is characterized by a basic information-
processing shift that favors existing knowledge over incoming
sensory evidence. Although, in the current experimental task,
this shift conferred a performance benefit, under most natural
viewing situations, it may provoke anomalous perceptual expe-
riences. Specifically, it might impose prior expectations on inputs
to the extent that, ultimately, formed percepts are generated that
have no direct sensory cause: hallucinations.
These findings fit neatly with and support current conceptual
and computational models of psychotic symptoms (8–12). For in-
stance, it has been hypothesized that a single core disturbance
relating to the balance between bottom-up and top-down pro-
cessing can explain both the hallucinatory experiences and the
bizarre delusional beliefs of psychotic patients (8, 11). Importantly,
we show that, on the perceptual level, a shift in this balance toward
prior knowledge is present both in a clinical group of individuals
with early psychosis and even associated with psychosis proneness
in the general population. Although schizotypy is a marker for
psychosis proneness as ascertained by previous longitudinal studies
(18), it is important to acknowledge that individuals in study 2 were
not suffering from psychosis or even a diagnosed mental illness.
Rather, those individuals scoring high on the scales identified a
number of unusual perceptual experiences. It is therefore striking
that the same information-processing shift was observed as was
found in early psychosis. Indeed, even in the early psychosis group,
no formal, categorical diagnosis was applicable (although it is known
that such groups have a high risk of transition to full psychiatric ill-
ness) (15). The findings may therefore suggest that the altered balance
Fig. 2. Illustration of a template image. This template image was used to
generate the two-tone image shown in Fig. 1A, Left. To experience the
effect of knowledge on perception, the reader should look back at Fig. 1A
after having viewed this template for some time. The perceptual experi-
ence of the two-tone image in Fig. 1A, Left, should have drastically changed
from the initial viewing: rather than looking like meaningless patches, a
coherent percept of the child and parts of the puzzle should now be ex-
perienced. The control image in Fig. 1A, Right, should still appear as
meaningless patches. Fig. 3. The individual-differences study (study 2). (A) Results of discrimination
task. (Left) Discrimination sensitivity in terms of d′ (mean ± SEM) in the Before
and After Block; again, the higher the d′ values, the better observers were able
to discriminate between test and control images. (Right) Response bias in terms
of the observers’ criterion (mean ± SEM); as in Fig. 1, a lower criterion indicates
a response bias to report the presence of a person in a given stimulus (in-
dependent of whether a test or control image is shown). (B) Relation of task
performance with schizotypy. (Left) Performance benefit due to prior knowl-
edge against the global CAPS score, which captures perceptual alterations that
show graded similarity with perceptual atypicalities experienced during psy-
chosis. Performance benefit was calculated as the difference in d′ between
After and Before Blocks. (Right) Relation between performance benefit and
global PDI scores of the participants. PDI captures belief-related alterations
similar to those seen during psychosis.
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is a fundamental trait that contributes to the emergence of psychosis
rather than a reflection or consequence of the psychotic state.
The specificity of the relation between performance on our task
and perceptual aspects of schizotypy is of particular interest. It has
long been known that altered perceptual experiences form a key
part of the emergence of psychosis (29). Given that the CAPS is
selective for measuring schizotypal perceptual phenomena rather
than targeting schizotypy in general (16), our findings indicate that a
shift in visual information processing that favors prior knowledge
over sensory evidence might be a marker for the mechanisms un-
derlying this observation. The finding that healthy individuals that
score high on this scale share this marker with our clinical group is in
line with the growing belief that psychotic mental illnesses are part
of a continuum with normality (19, 20). It supports the idea that the
putative atypicality underlying the emergence of perceptual psy-
chotic experiences relates directly to normal function of the system.
In other words, the potential for psychotic experiences such as
hallucinations might be a logical consequence of the way in which
our brain deals with the inherent ambiguity of sensory information
by incorporating prior knowledge into our perceptual processing.
The current study uncovered an imbalance of this processing type
that shows its effects at the perceptual level. However, within a hi-
erarchical and recurrent information-processing system such as the
human brain, an imbalance at any level will, in time, propagate up
and down the hierarchy and affects the whole system (8, 30), a
notion that might ultimately account for atypicalities in both lower-
level perceptual processing and higher-level belief formation in se-
vere mental illnesses and psychosis proneness (30).
As previously discussed, our aim in conducting these studies was
specifically to try to understand the processes that contribute to
the emergence of psychotic symptoms rather than to examine a
particular categorical diagnosis within which psychosis may occur.
This approach is part of a more general move in translational
research aimed at developing our understanding of the mecha-
nisms by which symptoms arise (22); this is seen as a necessary
prelude to a successful classificatory system in psychiatry. We do
not advocate that we can do without diagnostic systems in psy-
chiatry but rather selected our approach to fit the specific question
we aimed to address. Ultimately, it will be extremely interesting to
determine whether the shift in the bottom-up/top-down balance
identified here is a transdiagnostic effect, occurring generally in
early psychosis and psychosis proneness, or whether it is specific to
a particular diagnostic category such as schizophrenia. This future
work will be important and we suggest that having identified such
a cognitive biomarker will prove very useful in examining, and
validating or challenging existing taxonomies of mental illness.
Computational explanations of the balance between sensory
evidence and prior knowledge as highlighted by our study are
typically cast in terms of Bayesian models of perception and for-
malized within a predictive coding framework (5, 31, 32). In this
setting, the integration of bottom-up and top-down signals is me-
diated by the relative amount of information each of these com-
ponents provides: the stronger the sensory evidence is relative to
prior knowledge, the more it will impact on the final processing
output; conversely, if prior knowledge provides a relatively greater
amount of information it will be weighted more strongly. Our
findings fit comfortably with such a computational account: a
stronger reliance on top-down processing in psychosis-prone in-
dividuals as identified in both of our experiments suggests that
prior knowledge provides a large amount of information relative to
the amount of sensory evidence. Importantly, this could either be
due to atypically strong knowledge representations or, alterna-
tively, to an unusually noisy sensory system. Given well-established
psychotic deficits in early visual processing as discussed below, the
latter explanation might be more likely. However, the findings
cannot distinguish between these hypotheses. In this context, it is
interesting to note that the same theme of an imbalance between
bottom-up and top-down processing figures prominently in current
debates about autism (33, 34). This similarity highlights the notion
that predictive coding might provide a common framework within
which to understand mental illness more generally. An important
task for the future will be to explain the specificities of the different
pathological trajectories associated with different diagnostic cate-
gories within such a unifying approach.
Some authors argue that, on a neuronal level, the bottom-up/
top-down balance is implemented by neuromodulatory gain
control of feedforward and feedback neuronal circuitries;
adopting this approach, psychosis may thus be understood in
terms of atypicalities in these control mechanisms (35). Although
some models have focused on the emergence of delusions as a
consequence of enhanced gain of feed-forward connections (and
thus of the bottom-up signal) (8, 35, 36), the current findings
suggest that a shift in the opposite direction—i.e., either en-
hanced gain of feedback connections or reduced gain of feed-
forward connections—may account for perceptual changes
associated with psychosis. Given that our study did not directly
measure neuromodulatory gain control, this assertion is specu-
lative but it might provide a fruitful avenue for future research.
In schizophrenia, one important diagnostic category associated
with psychosis, both increased and decreased susceptibility to var-
ious visual illusions is observed (37–41). Although most studies
implicate atypicalities in early visual function as the source of these
differences, some authors argue that certain illusions rely on some
form of top-down processing (40, 41), a claim that has been con-
tested (42, 43). Critically, however, most researchers agree that
these visual illusions can be explained by processes within the visual
system, rather than by influences on visual function from higher-
level knowledge areas outside the visual system. Our findings are
therefore not at odds with decreased susceptibility to some visual
illusions in schizophrenic patients (37, 38, 40, 41). In fact, we argue
that our findings dovetail with and complement these previous re-
sults in a surprising way: independently of the underlying mecha-
nisms, atypicalities within the visual system result in the outputs of
the perceptual analysis being less well structured and less adaptive.
This could lead to an increased reliance on sources of information
from outside the visual system to structure visual percepts and
might make psychotic patients “hungry” for prior object knowledge.
It is this latter effect that was demonstrated in the current study.
We should add that an explanation of these findings in terms
of better memory for the information provided by the templates
is implausible in both studies. Existing evidence suggests that
both early psychosis and high schizotypal characteristics may be
associated with poorer working memory (44, 45).
Although performance improvements due to prior knowledge
were increased in the clinical group in study 1, these individuals
were no worse (than controls) in their ability to discriminate am-
biguous two-tone images without prior knowledge. This finding is
not directly relevant to the main question addressed in this study
but it is interesting because it contrasts with previous studies in
patients with established schizophrenia who show reduced ability
to spontaneously disambiguate two-tone images of faces without
prior knowledge (46, 47). This previous effect is most likely related
to well-established schizophrenic deficits in early and midlevel vi-
sion that affect perceptual organization, context processing and
integration (37, 38, 48–53) rather than to top-down influences from
high-level visual cognition as in the current study. We did not di-
rectly probe early and midlevel visual function in our participants,
but it seems most likely that the absence of impairments in spon-
taneous disambiguation of two-tone images in the clinical group
might be due to the specific nature of our stimulus material, which
was extensively piloted to be difficult to disambiguate without prior
knowledge (for details, see SI Materials and Methods).
To conclude, if we are to make progress in understanding the
nature of psychotic experiences and how they relate to cognitive
and neural markers, we have to identify candidate mechanisms for
how they may arise based on a growing understanding of the
relevant perceptual and cognitive systems. Here, we identified a
shift in visual information-processing in early psychosis and in
psychosis-prone healthy individuals. In both cases, top-down prior
knowledge was favored over bottom-up sensory evidence. These
alterations directly relate to visual function in healthy individuals
and our findings support the notion of a continuum between
normality and psychotic experiences. The changes in information
processing we report here might be among the influences that, in
























concert with other factors, contribute to the emergence of major
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and affective disorders.
Materials and Methods
Observers. In study 1, 34 individuals from the database of the Cambridge and
Peterborough Assessing,Managing, and Enhancing Outcomes (CAMEO) early
intervention in psychosis service (www.cameo.nhs.uk) based in Cambridge
consented to take part in the study: 16 healthy volunteers (9 males) and 18
at-risk mental state (ARMS) individuals (13 males). The groups were matched
on age and IQ, using Cattell’s Culture Fair Intelligence Test. For full de-
scription of the recruitment procedure and the clinical and demographic
profile of participants, see SI Materials and Methods and Table S1.
In study 2, the 40 healthy observers who participated in the study were
recruited from the local population through local mailing lists. For further
details, see SI Materials and Methods.
Stimuli. Ideal two-tone images have the following two properties: (i) they
should be impossible or very difficult to disambiguate before being given prior
knowledge about image content; and (ii) once participants have seen the
template, the two-tone images should give the strong experience of a coherent
object. Very few studies using two-tone images use stimuli that have both of
these properties. In the current study, we ran an extensive piloting phase to
generate appropriate images. For details, see SI Materials and Methods.
Experimental Procedure and Analysis. As described here and in Fig. 1, we used
a yes/no task with an analysis derived from signal detection theory to
characterize the balance between bottom-up and top-down processing in
our observers. A complete description of experimental procedures and
analyses is presented in SI Materials and Methods.
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